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Prehistoric origins: The compassion of far distant strangers 
 
Penny Spikins 
 
 
Introduction 
Human compassion has a long history. Archaeological evidence suggests that sustained 
care for those in need was part of daily life from the emergence of the very first early 
KXPDQVRYHURQHDQGKDOIPLOOLRQ\HDUVDJR7KRXJKEDUHO\RQWKHSDWKWRµKXPDQLW\¶LQ
biological terms, and physically and cognitively unlike us, such groups were nonetheless 
capable of something which feels quintessentially human on an emotional level - sustained 
care for those in need. In later species such as Neanderthals vulnerable individuals could be 
looked after for almost their whole lifetimes, apparently irrespective of circumstances. A 
whole range of injuries, from physical conditions leaving people unable to walk to brain 
injuries which will have affected cognitive abilities were accommodated. Moreover, wherever 
we find sizeable groups of individuals we also find some amongst them who must have been 
supported by the others. This extent of care challenges our preconceptions about survival in 
the distant past, seeming costly in functional terms. However far from being a weakness, 
emotional commitments to others seem to have been the basis for the in depth collaboration 
which was the basis for evolutionary success as well as being the starting point for those 
changes, such as brain expansion, that made us human. A human dependence on 
emotional commitments was not without its own costs - felt in terms of vulnerability to social 
HPRWLRQVVXFKDVVKDPHDQ[LHWLHVRYHURQH¶VVRFLDOYDOXHDQGYLJLODQFHRYHUVRFLDOWKUHDWV
However these in turn drove motivations to help and alleviate emotional and well as physical 
suffering.  
 
Ignoring the uncomfortable? 
Evidence for care is found both earlier in our evolutionary past than evidence for 
interpersonal violence and is more widespread. However such evidence receives remarkably 
little acknowledgement or attention (Hublin 2009; Spikins et al. 2010; Spikins 2015a; Tilley 
2015). Clear signs of extended care for illness or vulnerability is even more or less ignored, 
at best a short sentence in any lengthy paper (Tilley 2015). Why this should be so is difficult 
to understand - we might think we should be proud of a willingness to help others. The only 
explanation seems to be that care and compassion feel like a weakness. In our modern 
cultures the deep seated concept that success, and by implication evolutionary success, lies 
with selfish competition makes both the vulnerability of our ancestors, and their willingness 
to care for others, a strangely disturbing concept, one which is challenging to who we think 
we are.  
 
It is only over the last few years that we have begun to even recognise the compassion of 
these distant strangers and believe that it matters. And yet it does.  
 
The narrative of our past influences who we feel we are and what we believe in subtle ways. 
3DVWFUXHOW\LQVWLOVDFHUWDLQIHDUDQGPDNHVXVVRPHZKDWPRUHODFNLQJLQWUXVWDERXWRWKHU¶V
intentions, whilst acts of kindness in the far distant past have a certain power to inspire, 
especially if they took place in conditions in which compassion might be hard to find. 
Moreover the supposed behaviours of our distant ancestors have a surprising influence on 
modHUQEHKDYLRXUVDQGEHOLHIVWKURXJKZKDWLVGHVFULEHGDVµQDWXUDO¶'HVFULSWLRQVRID
heartless part, in which humanity was forged through violent competition, fed into 
justifications for the elimination of the disabled, epileptic or mentally ill that was the start of 
the Holocaust for example. Even now many believe that care for the vulnerable is something 
new to modern societies and that natural selection would, and moreover should, favour the 
independant, hard-hearted and tough.  Evidence for compassion, and the range of complex 
human social emotions in the past challenged perceptions of our ancestors as hard hearted 
and even callous. 
 
Material evidence also provides important clues to understanding the challenges and 
constraints of our own emotional minds (Gilbert this volume). We share a remarkable 
evolved capacity for compassion, however this same capacity to care also be lacking in 
resilience - influenced by attachment (Mikulincer and Shaver this volume, Narvaez this 
volume), and frequently lost when faced with outgroups or compassion fatigue (Singer, 
Favre and Vrticka this volume). Equally our emotions, the product of many different 
evolutionary processes each often in conflict, bind us to each other, and are a source of 
great comfort, yet also cause us much distress. Evidence for the evolution of past 
behaviours and the motivations which underlie them makes sense sense of the minds we 
are left with.  
 
The Prehistory of Compassion 
 
Early Transformations 
The material record from as far back as one and half million years ago demonstrates 
emotional bonds and motivations to relieve suffering which were already different in nature 
from those seen in our nearest relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos, and which formed part 
of the key transformations which made us human.  
 
Two exceptionally early examples of care are particularly significant. The first is a homo 
ergaster female (KNM ER 1808), one of the most complete skeletons of the time period 
found at Kobi Fora in Kenya, and dating to around 1.6 million years ago. Indications her long 
bones are consistent with a severe and fatal case of  hypervitaminosis A, identified through 
an abnormal outer layer on the bones which will have taken weeks or even months to form 
(figure 1). She will have been in extreme and immobilising pain, often losing consciousness, 
for this time, leading to the conclusion that even at this date those around her must have fed 
her, given her water and protected her from predators whilst she was ill (Walker et al. 1982; 
Walker & Shipman 1997; Tilley 2015, p.15). The second is even earlier, at 1.8 million years 
ago and from Dmanisi in Georgia. Here an individual who had lost all but one of their teeth 
(figure 2), and survived for probably months in this condition as the surrounding bone had 
reabsorbed (Lordkipanidze et al. 2005). It has been argued that they too must have been 
looked after by others (Lordkipanidze et al. 2005; Tilley 2015).  
 
< FIGURE 1 HERE > 
< FIGURE 2 HERE > 
 
What is distinctive in these early populations is not compassion per se, as compassion and a 
capacity to nurture are not unique to humans. Chimpanzees and bonobos, sharing a 
common ancestor with humans around 6-8 million years ago, are capable of a certain 
compassion. Chimpanzees console each other after a fight for example, and sometimes 
provide fleeting momentary care or assistance (de Waal 2008). However altruism in primates 
is limited (Silk & House 2011). Their willingness to engage in extended care is limited to 
infants, and support for their closest allies is limited to moments of help and consolation 
structured by a reciprocal return of favours, albeit remembered over many months (Schino & 
Aureli 2010). What is remarkable about examples of evidence for care in early humans is 
that care is provided to adults, and for extended periods.  
 
This earliest cases of extended care also notably co-incide with other evidence for different 
and perhaps closer emotional bonds than we see in other species. Evidence for attention to 
individuals at death is also emerging by this time for example. Pettitt has argued that the 
collection of thirteen australopithecines at Hadar site AL-333  may be a case of deliberate 
deposition in a certain ritual location (Pettitt 2013, p.44). Moreover the remains of potential 
contemporaneous individuals of Homo Naledi appear to represent some kind of mortuary 
location (Berger et al. 2015). Chimpanzees appear to grieve for the death of infants, with 
cases of mothers carrying around corpses for several weeks, but reactions to dead adults 
are fleeting, without the sense of a shared ritual we begin to see in human ancestors. 
Shared mortuary practice suggests  the extent of grief felt at the passing of a loved one and 
perhaps even more significantly shared ritual practice implies shared feeling, and a shared 
drive to appease emotional suffering. 
 
It seems to be no coincidence that at the same time as we see care for the ill or injured, and 
DWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLVHDVHGZHDOVRVHHHYLGHQFHIRUH[WHQGHGµFDUH¶LQRWKHUZays. The most 
unusual is that of additional care and attention taken over stone tools. Artefacts created by 
early humans begin to mean more than merely functional items at around this time. Whilst 
earlier tools were merely functional, the appearance of handaxes show elements not only of 
aesthetics but also a certain generosity in making a tool pleasing to use, as well as 
emotional self control in their production (Spikins 2012), see figure 3. Moreover handaxes 
made of elephant bone ivory, a far less practical material than stone, have been interpreted 
as implying some kind of close connection to these highly empathetic animals that goes 
beyond seeing them as merely food (Zutovski & Barkai 2015).  
 
< FIGURE 3 HERE > 
 
What drove these changes? From an evolutionary perspective there must have distinct 
selection pressures.  
 
The most obvious of the evolutionary pressures acting on human ancestors dates back at 
least 4 million years. Occupying  more open ecological conditions exposed early human 
ancestors to unstable and unpredictable environments and numerous predators, and it is 
clear from the tell tale marks on their bones that hominins were often prey. The first stages in 
the development of new ways of collaboration may thus have involved collaboratively 
defending themselves against predators, perhaps using tactics such as throwing stones as a 
group (Rose & Marshall 1996). These abilities then opened up opportunities to scavenge 
meat from carcasses, and quite possibly to begin to share food, with evidence from the 
earliest stone tools use to cut meat appearing over 3 million years ago. 
 
From these first collaborations however we see the development of strong selective 
pressures to be pro-social, and to collaborative in new, uniquely human ways. The context of 
early care lies within the timing of an important ecological transition occurring as early 
humans faced uniquely variable and unpredictable environments (Potts & Faith 2015) as 
well as moving into a new niche of collaborative hunting (Domínguez-Rodrigo et al. 2014) 
actively competing with large predators. Social collaboration solved the problems that these 
challenges posed by allowing them to buffer risks through hunting, finding food, and caring 
of infants collaboratively. Despite the challenges this is a time when the length of 
dependency of offspring increases, brain sizes increase and body shapes become larger.  
 
To a great extent early human collaboration depended on evolving emotional capacities. 
Collaborative hunting, food sharing and shared parenting demanding an ability not only to 
LQYHVWLQDQRWKHU¶VZHOOEHLQJDERYHRQH¶VRZQEXWDOVRWKHVHOIFRQWURODQGWROHUDQFHWR
HPRWLRQDOGLVWUHVVQHHGWRULVNRQH¶VZHOOEHLQJZKHQIDFLQJSUHGDWRUVRUGDQJHURXVSUH\RQ
behalf of others, or in forgoing immediate gratification in saving and sharing food. These new 
emotional capacities and commitments transformed human society (Nesse 2001) changing a 
JURXSRILQGLYLGXDOVLQWRDµXQLTXHDQGKLJKO\FRPSHWLWLYHSUHGDWRU\RUJDQLVP¶(Whiten & 
Erdal 2012, p.2119).  
 
The role of social reputation 
,WLVQ¶WGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZDQ\LQGLYLGXDOEHQHILWVIURPEHLQJSDUWRIDKLJKO\FRKesive 
collaborative group. However how new emotional capacities evolved is different issue. How 
would people become motivated to give up time or energy or take risks for others? Why not 
avoid potentially life threatening confrontations with predators or prey, or keep food to 
RQHVHOI"0RVWSDUWLFXODUO\ZK\FDUHDERXWSHRSOHWRRLOOWRHYHUUHSD\RQH¶VFDUHRUHYHQWKH
dead or even objects? Motivations to be concerned about the treatment of the dead, to 
identify with objects (take for example tendencies to infer motivations and feelings to moving 
shapes, (Heider & Simmel 1944)) are part of our complex human emotional minds, yet 
hardly seem to make sense in functional terms. 
 
There is of course, much debate. However the material record provides a key explanation in 
the significance of tangible signals of social or moral reputation to early human selective 
success.  
 
A positive social reputation plays a noticeable, if minor, role in the social dynamics of our 
QHDUHVWUHODWLYHV&KLPSDQ]HHVGRQ¶WQHHGWRFROODERUDWHWRVXUYLYHQRQHWKHOHVVWKHLU
understanding of fairness, and complex social dynamics based on remembered favours 
means that it sometimes pays in chimpanzee society to put others first. Even though 
chimpanzees mostly compete those alpha males who intervene to break up conflicts and 
EHKDYHµIDLUO\¶ZLOOVWD\GRPLQDQWIRUORQJHU2YHUO\DJJUHVVLYHGRPLQDQWPDOHVKDYHHYHQ
been known to be excluded by combined action of the other group members (Flack & De 
Waal 2000). Our common ancestor with chimpanzees, living around 6-8 million years ago is 
likely to have shared important cognitive and moral capacities to remember behaviours and 
make moral judgements of others.  
 
Where collaboration is key to survival selection pressures change. Rather than the most 
powerful, it is the best collaborators who are selected as allies and mates, willingly helped 
and trusted to help out in turn, and whose genes are most likely to be passed on. 
Judgements of how likeable (Gilbert 2015) or how trustworthy any individuals are to act in 
the interests of others (Nesse 2001) become the major currency of selection. Selection 
pressures on the best collaborators are however much more complex than pressures on 
physical abilities. Whereas it may be easy to judge who is the strongest or most powerful (or 
for this to be evident through physical conflicts) judging who is the best collaborator is 
complex. It is not behaviour per se, but motivations, which are at stake. After all a shrewd 
and self orientated individual might pretend to care deeply about the wellbeing of their ally or 
mate, and so elicit their support when they need it by behaving altruistically, but in reality be 
prepared to abandon them (as do chimpanzees) if they are no longer convenient. Detecting 
a genuine sensitivity to pro-social emotions is essential to the evolution of altruism and 
compassion, and in turn judgments of moral reputation need to use all the clues available 
and are built over many observations. Detecting and punishing cheats is also critically 
important, however doing so is cognitively demanding - if we see someone punishing 
someone else how do we know if there are being aggressive, or punishing an offender? Both 
PDNLQJUHOLDEOHVLJQDOVRIRQH¶VJHQXLQHPRWLYDWLRQVDQGWUXVWZRUWK\QDWXUHand being 
vigilant to such signals in others become all important (Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Hoffman et 
al. 2015).  
 
Selection pressures to be seen to be genuinely emotionally motivated by the wellbeing of 
others can be seen operating amongst hunter-gatherers in modern contexts. Amongst the 
Ache of Paraguay for example those who are judged to be most genuinely generous are 
looked after more willingly and extensively when ill or elderly (Gurven et al. 2000). Even 
adult males, the least dependant element of society, depend on this support, with hunters 
spending a third of their time too ill or injured to hunt. Amongst the Martu, those who are 
most generous are favoured as partners in collaborative hunts, and Bliege Bird and Power 
FRPPHQWWKDWµSURVRFLDOJHQHURVLW\SURGXFHVEHQHILWVLQGLUHFWO\WKURXJKWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
WUXVWLQJFRRSHUDWLYHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶(Bliege Bird & Power 2015, p.389). Experiments show 
that even in modern societies a reputation for caring about group wellbeing can have similar 
payoffs (Hardy & Van Vugt 2006).  
 
The importance of a good social or moral reputation will have driven much of human 
emotional and cognitive transformations. Firstly the complexities of making judgements of 
motivations prompted pressures on brain expansion and social understanding (Nowak & 
Sigmund 2005). Secondly we evolved to feel and signal our motivations in many different 
ZD\V&DULQJIRUWKHYXOQHUDEOHLVRQHZD\RIGLVSOD\LQJRQH¶VHPRWLRQDOFUHGHQWLDOVDVD
trustworthy ally, i.e. one that is that one is both motivated to help others in need, and has the 
emotional self control to do so. However the same capacities can also be signalled in other 
ways, such as how we treat the bodies of the dead or or even objects, as well as through 
evolved physical signs such as blushing or crying. Our material world plays a particular role  
- a finely made handaxe or other aesthetically pleasing object demonstrates a certain skill (ie 
social value), generosity and self control in its production which has a repeated effect, with 
each use reminding others of the qualities of its maker. Lastly we become highly sensitive to 
small signals of genuine intent, vigilant to tiny facial expressions which might indicate 
genuine emotions, alert to how ways in which people express themselves might indicate that 
they are on our side, and equally vigilant to what they think about us. As consciousness 
allows us to reflect upon ourselves, and collaborative morality (Tomasello & Vaish 2013) 
brings selection pressures from combined group opinion, vigilance of our social value 
becomes ever prominent.  
 Group support for the vulnerable 
Failing to be moved by the needs of others or unwilling to help them is likely to have been 
GDPDJLQJWRRQH¶VPRUDOUHSXWDWLRQSHUKDSVHYHQULVNLQJH[FOXVLRQDJDLQVWZKLFKWKH
economic costs of assistance appear minor. As mortuary practices involving larger 
collections of individuals appear after half a million years ago we tend to find a variety of 
debilitating conditions which must have been supported not only by individual allies but by 
the shared moral imperative of the group as a whole.  
 
The earliest example comes from the site of Sima de los Huesos in northern Spain dating to 
around 400,000 years ago. Here at least 28 individuals, closely related to Homo 
heidelbergensis, were deposited in a natural cavity as some form of mortuary ritual. Several 
of these suffered from conditions which will have required support. One elderly man had a 
damaged pelvis and would only have been able to walk slowly and with a stick (Bonmatí et 
al. 2011). One individual has ear hyperostosis, that probably caused deafness, and another 
a severe dental abscess (Pérez et al. 1997). A child mostly likely aged between 5 and 8 
years old at death suffered from craniosyntosis (Gracia et al. 2009).  
 
A similar range of vulnerabilities amongst Neanderthals is found at the later site of Shanidar 
Cave in Iraq. Here ten individuals were buried within a cave between 60,000 and 45,000 
years ago. Of these the most famous is an old man, aged around 35-45 years old who had 
multiple pathologies which appeared to have occurred in childhood and made any mobility 
very difficult. These included damage to his left eye and probable blindness (as well as 
damage to the left cerebral cortex), right arm paralysis, fractures of right humerus, 
osteomyelitis of the right clavicle, fracture to the right foot, and degenerative joint disease of 
the right knee and ankle (Solecki 1971; Trinkaus & Zimmerman 1982; Tilley 2015, p.16). His 
care must have involved the whole group, over at least a decade. Another male, aged 35-50, 
suffered from severe osteoarthritis of the right foot, which is also likely to have much limited 
his mobility. He also survived injury to left lung which must have involved having been 
immobilised for several weeks (Tilley 2015, p.16) 
 
Far from being unusual, care for illness and injury is so common that many authors conclude 
that amongst Neanderthals those who were vulnerable must have been routinely cared for 
(Solecki 1971; Hublin 2009; Spikins et al. 2010; Spikins 2015a),  see (Tilley 2015) for a 
detailed review). Other cases include that of an adult woman from Salé, in Morocco with 
congenital torticollis from birth, leading to cranial distortion and muscular trauma, as well 
possible limitations on limb movement, hip displacement and club foot (Hublin 2009); that of 
a man from La Chapelle aux Saints in France with significant disability relating to 
degenerative joint disease in the back, shoulder, hip and foot (Tilley 2015); and also an 
individual from La Ferrassie who recovered from a severe leg fracture, as well as being 
cared for for a substantial time whilst suffering from a severe systemic disease, most likely a 
pulmonary infection (Tilley 2015). Such care can never have been easy, with skeletal 
records showing frequent famines as well as demanding lifestyles, yet most remains of 
Neanderthals show signs of healed pathologies.  
 
Similar evidence continues to be found in ice age Europe after the arrival of our own 
species. Cases include those such as a man with dwarfism from Romito in Italy (Frayer et al. 
1987; Tilley 2015), and an individual from Dolni Vestonice in the Czech Republic with 
chrondrodysplasia calcificans punctata, causing severe developmental abnormalities 
(Trinkaus et al. 2001). 
 
Responses to mental and emotional suffering 
Part and parcel of the way that emotions evolve to foster collaboration is a certain sensitivity, 
even a vulnerability to our social emotions, alongside a greater vigilance of others, and 
greater anxieties over what individuals and the whole group feel about us or perceive our 
social value to be (see (Gilbert 2015) re Old Brain and New Brain mentalities). In 
consequence mental and emotional suffering, and a drive to alleviate it, seems to also have 
been part of the human condition as much as were physical stresses and caring responses.  
 
Emotional suffering and mental disorder is, of course, harder to identify archaeologically than 
physical illnesses and injuries. Nonetheless we can identify an early willingness to 
accommodate those who were cognitively different, and who struggled with that difference. 
Cognitive disabilities were likely to be part of the symptoms of the 450,000bp child with 
craniosyntosis found at Atapuerca (Gracia et al. 2009). Equally a 90-100,000bp child found 
at Quafzeh, who had suffered a traumatic brain injury leading to reduced brain volume also 
probably suffered neurological problems (Coqueugniot et al. 2014). Both were clearly cared 
for. Difference can at times confer a certain status. A woman, likely to have suffered epilepsy 
due to a malformation at the base of her skull received a rare elaborate burial in Mesolithic 
Germany, and has been interpreted as a shaman (Porr & Alt 2006). Equally the 
ethnographic record highlights that modern hunter-gatherers tend to be very accommodating 
of difference or emotional distress. Whitley describes how those with bipolar disorder and 
other conditions, particularly those suffering from terrifying hallucinations, tend to take on 
roles as shaman in hunter-gatherer societies for example (Whitley 2009). The unique talents 
of those with autism can be also be appreciated and socially valued, compensating for any 
lack of social understanding (Spikins 2009). 
 
Sometimes we can identify particular practices designed to alleviate emotional and mental 
suffering. An increasingly attention to shared mortuary practices from interments in natural 
pits or crevices to burials themselves seems to a response to a need to validate or alleviate 
feelings of grief through shared expressions (Pettitt 2013). We can however also see the 
emergence of specific treatments which appear to be a response to severe mental or 
emotional distress. Practices such as trepanation, are recorded from 12,000bp. Given how 
widespread trepanation is in later prehistory (found in between 2-8% of individuals in some 
regions of Neolithic Europe, (Robb 2002)) this seems likely to be not only a response to 
physical ailments of the brain (such as hydrocephaly) but also likely to be an attempt to treat 
other kinds of mental suffering or disorder. Tilley speculates that trepanation involves great 
deal with trust between the surgeon and the individual being treated (Tilley 2015, p.34). 
 
When written texts appear we see recorded description of mental suffering and attempts to 
find ways to alleviate such suffering.  Whilst the Babylonians lacked full understanding of the 
neurological basis of disorders, they constructed careful study of symptoms and attempt to 
classify and treat mental disorders. Treatments for depression, involving creating an image 
made of clay, imagining it as themselves and wishing themselves happiness are even 
evocative of compassion focused imagery exercises (Reynolds & Wilson 2013, pp.478±9). 
Barre discusses symptoms of depression in 3rd centry AD of the Far East (Barre 2001), 
Kruger describes depression in the Hebrew Bible (Kruger 2005) and Greaves discusses 
post-natal depression in Ancient Greece (Greaves 2009).  
 
That being cared for, and responding to emotional, mental and physical suffering, has been 
SDUWRIWKHKXPDQFRQGLWLRQVLQFHWKHHDUOLHVWUHPRWHO\µKXPDQ¶VSHFLHVH[SODLQVZK\WKHVH
responses are so integral to our neurological make-up. Far from an impediment to efficiency, 
widespread collaborative care is part of survival - only through a visible willingness to care 
come what may would the emotional context be created which prompted uniquely human 
collaboration.  
 
Complex emotional minds 
We can see in the archaeological record a trajectory of increasing motivations to care for 
DQGVXSSRUWRWKHUJURXSPHPEHUVDQGDOVRWRXQFRQVFLRXVO\GLVSOD\RQH¶VHPRWLRQDO
credentials in different ways. However beyond this general direction of change many of 
cognitive-emotional transformations which have taken place are more challenging to fully 
understand.  
 
Trust LVRWKHU¶VHPRWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWVLVFRPSOH[(Nesse 2001). We may trust those who 
are compassionate to the vulnerable to have our interests and those of the whole group at 
heart. However trust is also placed in individuals who punish those who appear to be 
dominators or cheats, risk their lives to kill prey to provide food, and even to be willing to 
take risks to defend us against outsiders. Relationships based on emotional commitments 
thus create complex conflicting motivations and have a darker side. Potential conflict 
EHWZHHQEHLQJFRPSDVVLRQDWHWRWKHYXOQHUDEOHDQGSURWHFWLQJRQH¶Vloved ones when faced 
with outsiders may explain why tolerance towards outgroups appears very late in human 
evolution.  
 
It is only after around 100,000 years ago, beginning in Africa, and in broad association with 
the emergence of Homo sapiens that we see good evidence for sustained inter-group 
collaboration. Raw materials are more regularly sourced from what must have been well 
outside the usual ranges of groups, and non-functional items, such as shell beads like those 
found in north Africa over 80,000 years (Bouzouggar et al. 2007) are created and moved 
around in what seem to be large scale networks of gift-giving. Similar networks are seen in 
modern hunter-gatherers such as the Jo-huansi, and play a key role in survival through 
providing distant friends in times of need. Weissner notes for example that In a time of food 
shortages following high winds and destruction of the mongongo nuts in /Xai/xai for example 
half of the population moved in with distant exchange partners, and would not have survived 
if this social support was not possible (Wiessner 2002). Collaborations between groups 
make modern human populations more resilient to fluctuations in resources than archaics. At 
the same time human populations disperse, rapidly occupying the whole globe, where 
previous species stayed within familiar ecological contexts (Spikins 2015b).  
 
Transformations after 100,000 years ago cleary reflect significant changes in social 
relationships. An increasing social tolerance, perhaps influenced by neurological changes, 
may be part of developments. However other changes in emotional capacities must also be 
playing a role in allowing large scale networks to emerge. Gift giving suggests an emphasis 
on complex emotional responses, depending on high level of theory of mind ability, such as 
gratitude. Equally there may have been changes in emotional and cognitive responses to 
objects, with gifts perhaps increasingly sparking social memories, provoking affiliative 
hormones and represent others as if they were there. The association of a new level of 
collaboration with risky dispersals argues that the darker side of human emotions, with 
intents to harm those who fail to honour commitments, may also play a role (Spikins 2015b). 
It is equally clear that cultural changes may be playing an important role. Certainly the 
ZLGHVSUHDGµGHPDQGVKDULQJ¶JLYLQJWRDQ\ZKRDUHLQQHHGHJDOLWDULDQLVPDQG
extraordinary willingness to support others at their own costs see in modern small scale 
hunter-gatherers is not merely a product of biology, but hard won through constant efforts to 
constrain ranked based mentalities and dominance (Boehm et al. 1993; Boehm 2012). In 
contrast to ingroup care and support we can almost see capacities to feel compassion for 
outgroups in an evolutionary sense as only just evolving.  
 
The trajectory of the evolution of human social emotions has been complex in other ways 
besides. While it is tempting to see evolution as a simple progression towards ourselves, 
reality was evidently more complicated. It clear that there is no single human mind but rather 
our genes code for possible minds depending on context. Sensitivity to social environments 
for example gives our minds a certain plasticity which seems to have been part of human 
success. By dropping back on self orientated strategies individuals in emotional harsh 
environments pay the psychological costs of a competitive mentality (Gilbert 2005) but avoid 
being exploited and are more likely to survive. We can see this in the archaeological and 
ethnographic record where there are times and places where, despite whatever cultural 
controls discourage ranked mentalities, competition and violence rise to the fore (Spikins 
2008). Warfare is extremely rare in forager societies (Fry & Söderberg 2013) and conflicts 
usually lead to movement rather than violence (Lee 2014), however sometimes, changing 
environments or other causes lead to cultures of competition and aggression (Spikins 
2015a).  
 
Furthermore whilst we look back on the past and create a narrative of progression there has 
never been a set direction along which compassionate responses evolved. Far from the 
pinnacle of evolution we are, like other human species, an evolutionary experiment - a 
compromise between conflicting pressures which will have lead in different directions in the 
past (and might equally in the future). Much as different primates show subtly different types 
of altruistic motivations (Silk & House 2011) the compassionate response of our branching 
set of distant ancestors will have varied. Spikins, Hitchens and Needham argue for example 
that the highly internally supportive contexts of Neanderthals reflects a much more internally 
focused compassion (2014). Our capacity for cruelty and inability to care for the environment 
calls in question in what sense we as a species can really be seen as better than 
alternatives.  
 
The more material evidence improves our understanding of how human compassion 
evolved, the more questions we raise.  
 
Conclusions 
We think of our ancestors as strong and invulnerable. However the material record illustrates 
that they were vulnerable to injury, illness, famine and even emotional distress. Rather than 
independence it was a uniquely human emotional interdependance, based on 
compassionate responses and emotional commitments to each other, which was part of 
human evolutionary success. Widespread emotional commitments set in place 
transformations which included a widening of compassionate responses and increasingly 
complex social understanding as well as a greater vulnerability to our emotional motivations 
and greater vigilance of subtle signals of emotional competencies, expressed everywhere 
from personal interactions to treatment of objects. To be motivated to care for others, to 
UHVSRQGWREHLQJFDUHGIRUDQGWREHVRPHZKDWDQ[LRXVDERXWRQH¶VVRFLDOYDOXHPDGHXV
human.  
 
Whilst we are able to consider in analytical terms the large scale evolutionary processes 
underlying the emergence of human compassion, our human capacities also allow us to 
reflect that the material evidence for the widespread willingness to care for others, despite 
the cost, in our far distant past, is nothing short of awe-inspiring.  
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Figure 1. KNM-Z ? ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐĂďŶŽƌŵĂůůĂǇĞƌŽĨďŽŶĞŽŶƚŚĞĨĞŵƵƌ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ? 
 
 
Figure 2. The 'toothless' Dmanisi ŚŽŵŝŶŝŶ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.  Olduvai handaxe, Lower Palaeolithic, about 1.2 million years old, Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania 
(source: Wikimedia Commons). 
